Louis Allen’s
uncorrected proof of his “Singapore
‘APPRECIATION BY THE
SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE, MALAYA ’
(C.A.
[Appendix III in
Allen ( op. cit. pp. 288-293)] Anyone who pretends even a passing interest in
this period of our history must read and absorb Vlieland’s incredibly prescient
assessment of the vital importance of the (then) Malayan Peninsular in the
event of the need to defend Malaya, which of course included Singapore
The second, and published, lecture was:--
‘THE STRATEGICAL PROBLEMS OF SINGAPORE
(A.E. Percival.) January 1937.
[Appendix II in Allen (op. cit. pp.272-287)
There is no
mention of either ‘Southern Siam’ or ‘northern Malaya’ in that second Percival
lecture: indeed, the prevailing sentiment is “Consequently, the principal
object of the defence of Singapore is to protect the Naval Base here against
attack until the arrival of the British Main Fleet and to afford security to
our forces’ ( ? prior and ) ‘subsequent to its arrival.” (p. 281).
Secondly. Given that Vlieland had exposed the dangers to Singapore by
enemy attacks in Southern Thailand and northern Malaya thereby giving an enemy
access to the west coast of the Malayan Peninsular, a counter strategy known as
‘Operation Matador’ was devised. (see Allen op.cit. pp.92-115.) Matador was
intended to prevent an enemy from gaining access to Southern Thai airfields at,
for example, Singora and Patani. Matador was never activated even though it was
known that the Japanese ‘Malaya Force’ had left Hainan
on 4 December 1941.(p.101). I believe the explanation to be that the British
had been bluffing for years and had fallen for their own propaganda of their
invincibility. Unfortunately for many, they (the British) were now to be pitted
against another equally arrogant self-perceived master race, the Japanese.
There are of course many other facets of the WHY question but once the usual
inaction led to ‘not to Matador’ (ie. not to invade Southern
Thailand in order to attempt to secure the Kra Isthmus against the Japanese.)
then Malaya, including Singapore, was lost to Yamashita and Tsuji as I shall
attempt briefly to explain in my addressing of the HOW question.
In addressing the question HOW, it is vital to re-identify TSUJI and to recall
his remarkable and seminal role in the planning and executing of the Malayan
Campaign. [It is idle but nevertheless tempting to reflect, even if only
momentarily, upon the outcome in the ‘Far East ’
if Tsuji had been on our side.]
I have already (see TIMOR p. 2) identified
Tsuji (his family name) as the Director of Planning and Operations Staff of the
Malayan Campaign under General Yamashita Commander of the 25th. Japanese Army.
(That Army was composed of 3 Divisions:-- the 5th., the 18th. and the Imperial
Guards Divisions.)
Tsuji seems to have escaped the attention of most writers although Legg (
op.cit. p. 210) records Tsuji’s acknowledgement that the Australian 8th
Division at Gemas fought, under Gordon Bennett, “with a bravery we (Japanese)
had not previously seen” and “completely changed the aspect of the combat
zone.” Until Gemas (which is about 2/3rds down the Malayan Peninsular),
Yamashita had been able to do almost as he wished, the Japanese advancing at
the rate of about 20 km. per day with repeated, morale destroying withdrawals
by 2 British Indian Divisions, 3 British Indian Brigades, 2 Malay Volunteers
Brigades and 2 British Army Brigades
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